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LET'S THINK ABOUT HOG SUPPLIES AND PRICES! 
It still looks as if we're headed for hog price and production troubles in 
the next few years. If so, the time t o think and plan is now-ahead of 
time. Here a re some alternatives you may want to think a bout and discuss. 
by Geoffrey Shepherd, Don Kaldor and Francis A. Kutish 
H OG PRICES for the first sev-
eral months of 1959 averaged 
about $4 lower than a year earlier. 
The reason : Hog slaughter was up 
16 percent. This more than offset 
the effects of a smaller beef supply 
and higher consumer incomes. And 
hog prices are likely to be still lower 
when the spring crop come to mar-
ket next fall. 
The pig crop report last Decem-
ber estimated that the '59 spring 
pig crop w o u l d be 13 percent 
larger than the ' 58 spring pig crop. 
The March 1959 report for the nine 
Corn Belt states estimated that the 
spring crop in those states would 
be 10 percent larger than the year 
before. These increases will depress 
hog prices this fall. Prices this fall 
are likely to average $2-$4 lower 
than a year ago. And, if there's dry 
weather in the West and a flood of 
beef cattle liguidations, hog prices 
could be even lower. 
We expect a further boost in hog 
production in 1960. So hog prices 
could be down to the 10-12 cent 
range by fall then. In the span of 2 
years, there's a distinct possibility 
GEOFFREY SH EPH ERD, DON KALDOR 
and FRANC IS A. KUTISH a re professors of 
ag ricul tura l economics and are me mbers 
of the staff of the Center fo r Agricultural 
Adjustment at Iowa State College. 
· A contr ibution from 
The Center for 
Agricultural Adjustment . 
that hogs will have dropped from 
their $20 national average farm 
price level in '58 to $ 10 per 100 
pounds. If hogs do get down to a 
dime, there' 11 be strong pressure to 
"do something" right at election 
time. 
But the time to think about and 
discuss problems like these is now-
ahead of time. The more thought 
and planning now, the better a pro-
gram will be able to work if it 
should be called for by unduly low 
hog prices in the near future. 
A Real Problem . . . 
Variations in hog production and 
prices create problems all along the 
line- from hog producer to pork 
consumer. Pork customers lost when 
pork supplies are short may be hard 
to win back when pork becomes 
plentiful again. Hog production, 
processing and distribution equip-
ment and labor are partly unused 
when h og production is low. 
They're overburdened when hog 
output is high. This increases costs 
which come out of the prices paid 
to producers and, eventually, from 
consumers, too. This has an impact 
on the economy as a whole and 
. warrants social action to prevent" it. 
Can you as an individual farm 
operator do anything about this? 
Some attempt to meet this situation 
by cutting their h o g production 
when total hog supplies are large 
and prices low. Then they increase 
production later when total sup-
plies are low and prices high. This 
is operating against the cycle rather 
than going along with it. These pro-
ducers have the most hogs to sell 
when prices are high; the least, 
when prices are low. 
Other producers don't change 
their production from year to year. 
They produce the most efficient 
number for their particular physical 
farm setup year in and year out. 
Can producers as a group, or the 
nation as a whole, do something 
that individual farmers can't? That 
would be to smooth out the cycles 
in hog production and prices so as 
to remove them as a problem for 
individual producers. 
Corn Storage Attempt 
The corn storage program was 
one attempt to do this. It was ori-
ginally set up in the belief that 
stabilizing the flow of corn into 
consumption would a l so stabilize 
livestock production a n d prices. 
This stabilizing effect was expected 
to be most pronounced for hogs. 
The bulk of the nation's hogs is 
produced in the Corn Belt on corn-
producing farms, and corn makes 
up about 80 percent of their feed. 
There's some evidence that the 
corn program has had a stabilizing 
effect on corn prices and consump-
tion. It's able to cushion hog pro-
duction against the irregular shocks 
from variations in corn production 
caused by irregular variations in the 
weather. But it doesn't appear to 
have had a stabilizing effect on the 
cyclic movements of hog produc-
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tion and prices which vary from 4-6 
years in length. Chart 1 shows that 
hog prices vary cyclically now much 
as they did before World War II~ 
chiefly in response to changes m 
the hog-corn price ratio. A major 
cyclic increase in production and 
decline in prices took place in 1955-
5 6. And another is forecast for 
1959-60. 
At least one USDA analyst be-
lieves that the partial stabilization 
of corn supplies and prices has in-
creased the tendency for hog prices 
and production to move in cycles. 
The cycle is more free to perpetuate 
itself unhampered by irregular vari-
ations in corn supplies. 
There's evidence also that the 
"elasticity" of the demand for hogs 
is less now than it was 20 years 
ago. B efo r e World War II, a 
change of 10 percent in hog slaugh-
ter caused an opposite change of 
about 15 percent in hog prices. In 
recent years, it has caused a change 
of about 25 percent. So the effect 
of any variation in hog slaughter 
on prices now is greater than it used 
to be. And there's further evidence 
that hog production responds more 
to a given price change than for-
merly. 
It's becoming apparent, therefore, 
that a feed-grain stabilization pro-
gram can stabilize hog production 
against variations in feed-grain pro-
duction. But it can't stabilize hog 
production against cyclic variations 
resulting from like variations in hog 
prices. This c a 11 s for measures 
which deal directly with hog prices. 
Stabilize Hog Prices? 
The cyclic behavior of hog pro-
duction results from producers' er-
rors of expectation or estimation of 
hog prices. Most producers seem to 
base their expectations on current 
prices. The length o~ the . cycle is 
determined by the time mvolved 
before farmers change their hog 
production in response to prices-
plus the time of gestation and the 
growing period for hogs. 
Most producers wait until hog 
prices have remained high or low 
for several months or a year before 
they decide to produce m o r e or 
fewer hogs in response to high or 
low hog prices. Then 10-12 months 
go by from the time the sows are 
bred to the time when pigs from 
the sows can be marketed. As a re-
sult, hog production and prices 
tend to move in about 4-year cycles. 
That is, high hog prices cause high 
production a year or two later; this 
high production causes l o w hog 
prices; these low prices cause low 
hog production a year or two later, 
and so on. 
How can this cycle be broken? 
The United States is primarily a 
price-directed economy. So a pos-
sible point of attack would be to 
stabilize hog prices in the belief 
that this would stabilize hog pro-
Chart I. 
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duction. Stabilization programs for 
corn and other feed grains have 
helped stabilize the denominator 
(the price of corn) in the hog-com 
ratio. What's needed n o w is to 
stabilize the numerator (the price 
of hogs) . 
Government Purchases? 0 n e 
way to stabilize hog prices would 
be for the federal government to 
step in when hog prices were cycli-
cally low and buy enough pork, lard 
or both to bring hog prices up to-
ward desired levels. This was done 
on a large scale in 1933-34. The 
government bought about 6 million 
little pigs and bred sows to bolster 
hog prices. 
But public criticism of this ac-
tion was so great and lasted so many 
years that it's doubtful if t~e gov-
ernment would want to try it on a 
large scale again. Government pur-
chases were made on a very small 
scale when hog prices were low in 
1956, but the effects on prices were 
too small to measure. 
The big problem is what to do 
with the pork or lard after it's pur-
chased. Small quantities can be 
handled domestically through the 
school lunch and other distribution 
programs. But if substantial quan-
tities were purchased and returned 
to the market, they'd depress prices 
to the same point as if the govern-
ment hadn't stepped into the mar-
ket in the first place. 
Exports to f o r e i g n countries 
could be increased to some extent 
by subsidizing them. But most of 
our farm exports are subsidized al-
ready, and more of it might lead to 
further disturbances of competing 
suppliers abroad. Lard exports us-
ually account for about 20 percent 
of our lard production, but lard 
makes up only about 20 percent of 
hog carcass weight. Pork exports 
usually account for only about 1 
percent of our total pork produc-
tion. 
Taken altogether, it appears that 
government purchases and exports 
could be used only to a small extent 
to support hog prices. 
Marketing Quotas? Another 
possible way to stabilize hog prices 
would be to use marketing quotas 
- to control hog production direct-
ly and keep it from increasing much 
above average when hog prices rise 
to a cyclic peak. 
This method deserves intensive 
study. It would involve a good 
many thorny administrative prob-
lems and reguire the close regula-
tion of producers. Also, it would 
take considerable time before the 
effects of such a program could 
show up in the market; it could 
hardly be effective this year, for ex-
ample. In addition, it would reduce 
feed-grain consumption and thus 
add to feed-grain surpluses. 
Direct Payments? A less dif-
ficult and guicker-acting method 
for stabilizing prices would be di-
rect payments related to prices. So 
long as hog production continues 
to vary cyclically, variations in hog 
prices are necessary to clear the 
market. Stable prices are needed to 
guide hog producers to stable pro-
duction, but, at the same time, vary-
ing prices are needed to clear the 
market. 
These two things could be ac-
complished at the same time if 
prices were left free to vary and 
clear the market but hog producers 
were, in effect, guaranteed a fixed 
price announced in advance. Then 
if the market price fell below the 
level, the difference would be made 
up by a direct payment. 
The guaranteed price, for ex-
ample, might be a U. S. farm aver-
age price of $15 per 100 pounds. 
If the actual average price fell to 
$12, then $3 per 100 pounds would 
be paid to each producer who sold 
hogs that month. This would bring 
the ret11rns to the average producer 
up to $15. 
Each producer would h a v e as 
much incentive as ever to get the 
best price he could when he sold 
his hogs because he'd get a pay-
ment of $3 per 100 pounds, re-
gardless of the price for his particu-
lar sale. He'd simply have to pre-
sent some authoritative evidence of 
the total weight of the hogs he'd 
sold- a copy of his sales slip, for 
example-and receive payment at 
the rate of $3 per 100 pounds. 
What Purpose? The effects of 
d i r e c t payments and their cost 
would depend mainly on the level 
of the base price and how producers 
responded to direct payments. The 
base price level would depend on 
the purpose of the program. The two 
chief objectives in most people's 
minds appear to be ( 1) to raise the 
long-run incomes of hog producers 
or ( 2) to reduce cyclic variations in 
hog production and prices. 
( 1) If the objective were to raise 
the long-run level of incomes, the 
base price would need to be set 
higher than the long-run level of 
market prices. But this would result 
in increased hog production- in re-
sponse both to the higher prices and 
to less price uncertainty. This would 
tend to drive hog prices down, mak-
ing larger direct payments neces-
sary. And the payments would have 
to be made on increasing numbers 
of hogs. This would continue until 
public criticism of the size of the 
payments forced a reduction in the 
base price. 
( 2) If the objective were only to 
reduce cyclic variations in hog pro-
duction and prices, the base price 
should be set a little lower than the 
long-run average price. This is be-
cause most hog producers would 
produce more for a guaranteed price 
of, say, $15 than they would for an 
uncertain price that later turned 
out to be $15. 
The long-run income-raising ob-
jective doesn't seem practical for 
hogs. It would be similar to the ex-
perience with corn and other feed 
grains. The original corn price-
stabilization program was converted 
into an income-raising program by 
setting the loan levels above long-
run average prices rather than a 
little below them. That the income-
raising objective is incompatible 
with the stabilization objective is 
seen in the accumulation of huge 
stocks and in the dropping of per-
centages of parity prices as bases 
for corn loan rates last November. 
It doesn't seem reasonable to go 
through the same process again with 
hogs. 
What Levels? There are several 
different methods we might think 
about for use in setting the level of 
the base price. 
Parity prices : The parity price for 
hogs on Feb. 15, 1959, was $21.60. 
Parity prices have been above the 
actual market prices of hogs most 
of the time since 1949. If parity 
prices had been used as the base 
price below which direct payments 
would have been made, hog produc-
tion would have increased consider-
ably. And market prices would have 
fallen so low that payments would 
have had to increase substantially. 
This probably would have caused 
a drastic lowering of the base price 
- p e r hap s abandonment of the 
whole program. Percentages of par-
ity substantially below 100 might 
work better. But parity prices take 
changes in technology into account 
so slowly that o t h e r alternatives 
should be considered. 
A moving average of m ark e t 
prices over a period of years long 
enough to average out the effects 
of cyclic movements might be used. 
Hog production-price cycles run 
about 4 years in length. So a 4-year 
moving average of market prices 
would be a minimum to average 
out the effects of the cycle. But 
there'd still be quite a bit of varia-
tion in the 4-year average since 
each cycle is somewhat irregular 
within itself. An 8-year moving 
average might help in this regard. 
The chief shortcoming of moving 
averages, however, is that they pro-
ject the past into a future that's 
never guite the same as the past. 
The current level of the 8-year 
moving average is higher than hog 
prices are likely to average in the 
next few years. The past 8-year pe-
riod includes several years when 
hog prices were higher than their 
normal relation to corn prices; much 
corn was going under government 
loan and into CCC stocks rather 
than into hogs. This can't go on 
forever, and sometime this move-
ment of corn into CCC stocks will 
have to stop. The relation between 
corn prices and hog production and 
prices then will be different from 
the relation in the recent past. 
Changes affecting b o t h supply 
and demand are only slowly assimi-
lated into a moving average. So the 
8-year average is always at least 
4 years behind the times. Needed is 
a base price which reflects recent 
and prospective developments in 
technology and in demand more ac-
curately than 4- or 8-year moving 
averages. 
A 13: 1 ho i-corn price ratio base: 
One of the most important factors 
affecting hog production is the hog-
corn price ratio. Normally, when 
hog prices are high relative to corn 
prices, hog production is m o r e 
profitable than when the hog-corn 
price ratio is low, and hog produc-
tion expands. Similarly, a low hog-
corn price ratio leads to a reduction 
in hog production, and an average 
ratio leads to an average produc-
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tion. Over time, this ratio has aver-
aged about 13: 1 (see chart 2) . 
The national average farm price 
of corn in recent months has been 
a little higher than $1 a bushel. 
With average weather, it has been 
estimated that the average price is 
likely to run at about $1, or even a 
little lower, in the next year or two. 
(The price usually runs lower than 
the loan rate when feed supplies 
are large- even b e l o w the rate 
available to noncompliers in recent 
years.) This by itself would indicate 
that a level of about $13 per 100 
pounds would provide about a 13: 1 
hog-corn price ratio. This is the 
ratio which, in the past, has led 
neither to an increase nor decrease 
but to an average production of 
hogs. 
But it's still likely that producers 
would respond more to a guaran-
teed price than to uncertain prices 
which might average out the same 
as the guaranteed level. So it might 
be necessary to reduce the guaran-
teed price by some figure such as 
10 percent to avoid an increase in 
hog production from eliminating 
price uncertainty. This would mean 
that the base level for hog prices 
would need to be, not $13, but 
perhaps $12 to avoid stimulating an 
increase in hog production. 
It could also be argued that the 
base price for hogs should be kept 
at $13 under current conditions, 
with the loan for corn available to 
all producers. This would remove 
uncertainty about the returns from 
the sale of corn as corn, and a 
direct-payment program for hogs 
would remove uncertainty a b o u t 
hog prices. A base price for hogs 
set at the traditional 13 : 1 ratio to 
$1 corn ( $13 for hogs) might be 
needed to make feeding corn to 
hogs as attractive as selling corn 
as corn. 
The 13: 1 ratio, with uncertainty 
removed for both com and hog 
prices, might have about the same 
effect on hog production that it 
used to have w i t h uncertainty 
existing for both corn and hog 
prices. That is, the 13.1 ratio now 
might result in average hog produc-
tion as it did when both corn and 
hog prices were uncertain. 
Corn is the main item in the cost 
of raising hogs. But there are also 
other costs: labor, building replace-
ments, feeders, fences, etc. The hog-
com ratio doesn't measure these, 
and these costs have gone up. So a 
13: 1 hog-corn ratio today probably 
won't induce an increase to the ex-
tent that it did 20 years ago. 
It's still likely, however, that a 
13 : 1 ratio w o u l d make feeding 
hogs more attractive than feeding 
other livestock. There'd very likely 
be some expansion in hogs at the 
expense of other livestock where 
uncertainty still existed. So per-
haps the ratio used should be about 
12: 1. 
The Cost? The cost of direct 
payments depends on the difference 
between the "support" price and the 
actual price and on the number of 
units sold. The general magnitude 
of the costs can be gauged by multi-
Chart 2. 
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plying the average annual slaughter 
of about 82 million head by the 
average market weight of about 235 
pounds- about 20 billion pounds. 
So, for every dollar difference be-
tween the "support" price and the 
actual price, lasting for a year, the 
cost would be about 200 million 
dollars. 
Some Problems 
Several problems n e e d to be 
solved if direct payments were to 
work well in practice. Should pay-
ments, for example, be made on a 
seasonal or flat annual basis or just 
at periods of seasonally low prices? 
In this article, we've used a flat 
base price ( $12 or $13) for hogs. 
But if direct payments were made 
on a weekly or monthly basis, the 
base price should vary seasonally 
somewhat like the average seasonal 
variation in market prices. It could 
perhaps be tied to the average prices 
of barrows and gilts paid by pack-
ers as published both on a weekly 
and monthly basis by the USDA. 
If direct payments were made on 
an annual basis, a flat price could 
be used. But this would mean that 
producers would have to wait from 
1-12 months after selling hogs be-
fore receiving a payment. It would 
also be necessary to prevent more 
than one payment being made on 
the same lot of hogs as it moved 
from producer to packer if it went 
through several hands on the way. 
As in the case of the wool incentive 
payment plan, local committees 
might certify that the hogs were 
produced by the seller. 
Other guestions : Could hog pro-
duction be controlled to some extent 
by a provision for payments only 
on some base quota for each indi-
vidual producer? If so, how could 
these gt.iotas be set? How would the 
guotas be policed? And could they 
be put in effect fast enough to 
meet immediate problems? Finally, 
how far in advance should the base 
price be announced to enable pro-
ducers to plan most effectively? 
This article doesn't pretend to 
give "pat" answers. But the time to 
discuss and to think about problems 
like these is now- ahead of time. 
We've seen from experience that 
stop-gap solutions don't always 
work as expected and sometimes 
tend to create even greater prob-
lems in the future. 
